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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Frank D. Marks appeals from the judgment of dismissal entered upon the
district court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The state charged Marks with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor
under sixteen “based on allegations that Marks had sexually abused two
biological daughters and a stepdaughter living in his home.” State v. Marks, 156
Idaho 559, 562, 328 P.3d 539, 542 (Ct. App. 2014). “[T]he jury found Marks
guilty of all three counts,” and “[t]he district court imposed concurrent unified
sentences of life with thirty years fixed.” Id. Marks filed an I.C.R. 35 motion,
which the district court denied. Id.
On direct appeal, Marks raised three claims. First, Marks argued “that the
court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional right to present a
defense by excluding a physician from testifying for the defense.” Marks, 156
Idaho at 562, 328 P.3d at 542. Second, Marks asserted the trial court erred by
admitting evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b). Id. Finally, Marks challenged the
denial of his Rule 35 motion. Id. at 567-568, 328 P.3d at 547-548.

The Court

of Appeals denied relief on all three of Marks’ claims. See generally Marks,
supra.
Marks, through counsel, filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief
alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel, “witness misconduct,” and prosecutorial misconduct. (R., pp.5-8.) The
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state filed an answer (R., pp.12-13), and a separate motion for summary
1
dismissal (Aug. , pp.71-79). After the state filed its answer, but before it filed its

motion for summary dismissal, Marks filed a “Motion to Supplement Petition,”
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(d). (Aug., pp.42-43, 52-53.) The district court denied
Marks’ Motion to Supplement Petition, granted the state’s motion for summary
dismissal, and entered a judgment dismissing Marks’ petition. (R., pp.49-62, 64;
Aug., pp.68-69.) Marks timely appealed. (R., pp.66-68.)

1

The state will use “Aug.” to refer to the documents in the electronic file
“Additional Clerk’s Record.pdf” as that is the designation used in the footer of
those documents.
2

ISSUES
Marks states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the district court err in refusing to allow Mr. Marks to amend
his petition?
2. Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Marks’ claim that the
state denied him a fair trial failing to conduct a forensic
examination of the alleged victims on the basis that the claim
could have been raised on direct appeal?
3. Did the district court err in failing to address three of Mr. Marks’
claims prior to dismissing his petition?
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1. Has Marks failed to show the district court erred in failing to sua sponte treat his
I.R.C.P. 15(d) Motion to Supplement Petition as a motion to amend pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 15(a) despite the fact that Marks expressly advised the court he was not
pursuing an amendment? Has Marks also failed to show error in the denial of
his Motion to Supplement Petition?
2. Has Marks failed to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing any
claim in his petition?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Marks Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Failure To Sua Sponte
Treat His I.R.C.P. 15(d) Motion To Supplement Petition As A Motion To Amend
Pursuant To I.R.C.P. 15(a) Or Error In The Court’s Denial Of The Motion To
Supplement Petition
A.

Introduction
Marks filed a Motion to Supplement Petition pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(d).

(Aug., pp.42-43, 52-53.) At the hearing on his Motion to Supplement Petition,
post-conviction counsel advised the court that he intentionally filed his motion
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(d) rather than requesting an amendment pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 15(a) because, he explained, he wanted to “avoid the necessity of
sending down another petition to be verified by [Marks].” (9/25/2015 Tr., p.19,
Ls.16-21.)

The district court denied Marks’ Motion to Supplement Petition.

(Aug., pp.68-69.)
On appeal Marks complains that he and the district court erred in
“concluding that his motion was controlled by IRCP 15(d),” and erred in denying
the motion without first giving 20 days notice of the reasons for denying the
motion because, he argues, claims cannot be summarily dismissed without such
notice. (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.) Marks also argues that the district court erred
in failing to specifically address one of the claims in his Motion to Supplement
Petition in its order denying the motion. (Appellant’s brief, p.7.) All of Marks’
arguments fail. Because Marks specifically asked the district court to consider
his Motion to Supplement Petition as a motion filed under I.R.C.P. 15(d), any
error in applying that provision of the rule is invited. Marks’ complaint about the
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lack of 20 days notice fails because it is contrary to law. Finally, the Court
should decline to address Marks’ claim that the district court erred by failing to
specifically address one of his claims because Marks failed to present his
complaint to the district court as required by I.R.C.P. 52(c).
B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to grant or deny a motion filed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15 is left

to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606,
610, 570 P.2d 284, 288 (1977). In deciding whether the district court abused its
discretion, this Court considers whether the district court (1) perceived the issue
as discretionary; (2) acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent
with the applicable legal standards; and (3) exercised reason in reaching its
decision. State v. Taylor, 157 Idaho 186, 194, 335 P.3d 31, 39 (2014) (quoting
State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673, 674, 931 P.2d 1191, 1192 (1997)).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Marks’ Motion
To Supplement Petition
Post-conviction cases are generally governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure. Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110, 15 P.3d 820, 823 (2000). Thus,
motions to amend or supplement a post-conviction petition are governed by
I.R.C.P. 15.

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(d), a party may “serve a supplemental

pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after
the date of the pleading to be supplemented.”
In his Motion to Supplement Petition, Marks expressly relied on I.R.C.P.
15(d) in asking the court to “allow an additional allegation of ineffective
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assistance of counsel” based on trial counsel’s alleged failure to “properly
prepare to rebut and investigate the testimony of the jail house informant . . .,
Ronald Inauen and an allegation that Mr. Marks did not receive a fair trial in that
his conviction was based in part on perjury.” (Aug., pp.42-43, 52-53.) At the
hearing on his motion, the district court inquired whether I.R.C.P. 15 governed
Marks’ motion, and whether it was “similar to an amendment of a complaint.”
(9/25/2015 Tr., p.19, Ls.14-15.) Post-conviction counsel responded:
Your Honor, they talk about -- specifically, there’s a rule that
deals with supplementation, not an amended complaint. And I
cited that so as to avoid the necessity of sending down another
petition to be verified by my client, that sort of thing.
But the rule I cite in the motion is specifically for
supplementation, not amendment, and I was doing that simply to
be able to avoid sending down an amended petition to send back.
But I cite the rule in my motion.
(9/25/2015 Tr., p.19, L.16 – p.20, L.1.)
The court commented, “It’s 15(d) that you cited to,” and counsel agreed,
“Yeah, that talks directly to supplementation, as opposed to amendment.”
(9/25/2015 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-4.)

After the hearing, the district court entered a

written decision denying Marks’ Motion to Supplement Petition concluding, in
relevant part:
Plaintiff cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel with bare allegations. The State has offered evidence that
trial counsel properly investigated the claims raised here by
Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not offered any facts supporting his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel as to the testimony of the witness
in question. Further, assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiff was
allowed to supplement the petition with the proffered witness, it
would merely be cumulative and impeaching.
It would not
demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective.
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Therefore, the Court determines that the Motion to
Supplement the Petition would only add cumulative and
impeaching evidence that would probably not lead to an acquittal.
Further, Plaintiff has failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective
regarding the testimony of the informant at trial. The State has
provided evidence that trial counsel did investigate the testimony
and offered rebuttal witnesses that were incarcerated with the
Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement the Petition is
denied.
(Aug., pp.68-69 (emphasis original).)
On appeal, Marks first complains that both he “and the court erred in
concluding that his motion was controlled by IRCP 15(d)” because, he asserts,
subsection (d) of Rule 15 does not apply to his ineffective assistance of counsel
and fair trial claims that were the subject of his Motion to Supplement Petition
since those “deficiencies in his convictions occurred at the time of trial, well
before his petition for post-conviction [sic] was filed.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.)
This argument is precisely why the district court could not have erred in denying
Marks’ motion – I.R.C.P. 15(d) only applies if the supplemental pleading “set[s]
out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the
pleading to be supplemented.” As Marks notes on appeal, the alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel and the alleged denial of his right to a fair trial necessarily
occurred before Marks filed his post-conviction petition. Thus, Marks’ request to
“supplement” his petition with such claims would be properly denied pursuant to
the requirements of the rule.
Marks, however, seeks to avoid the provision of the rule on which his
Motion to Supplement Petition was expressly based, arguing that although he
erred in citing I.R.C.P. 15(d), and the district court erred in referring to that rule,
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the “error is irrelevant because even though the court made passing reference to
IRCP 15(d), it did not actually apply that rule.” (Appellant’s brief, p.6.) The error
is not “irrelevant,” it is invited. Marks cannot predicate error on a decision he
acquiesced in or invited. State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, ___, 348 P.3d 1, 35
(2015) (“The invited error doctrine precludes a criminal defendant from
‘consciously’ inviting district court action and then successfully claiming those
actions are erroneous on appeal.”).
Marks next argues that the district court abused its discretion “in denying
amendment of the petition to add another claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel by analyzing the claim as if it was subject to a motion for summary
dismissal and by ignoring altogether the claim of an unfair trial based upon
perjured testimony.” (Appellant’s brief, p.6.) More specifically, Marks contends
that in conducting such an “analysis prior to allowing amendment of the petition,
the court violated I.C. § 19-4906(b) which requires 20 days notice of the court’s
intent to summarily dismiss a claim.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.) This argument
lacks merit. The 20-day notice requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(b) governs the
timeframe that must be afforded to a petitioner to respond to a notice of intent to
dismiss. It has no bearing on the court’s response to a Motion to Supplement
Petition. Marks’ reliance on I.C. § 19-4906(b) in an effort to demonstrate error in
the denial of his Motion to Supplement Petition fails.
Marks also argues that “in failing to rule on the amendment of the petition
to allow a claim for relief because the trial was unfair, the district court abused its
discretion.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)

This argument fails because the record
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demonstrates that the district court denied Marks’ Motion to Supplement. (R.,
p.67.) That the district court did not explicitly discuss the component of Marks’
Motion to Supplement in which he alleged he “did not receive a fair trial” (Aug.,
p.42), does not mean the district court “failed to rule” on Marks’ motion. The
district court clearly denied the motion. If Marks wanted the district court to
provide specific reasons for the denial with respect to his unfair trial allegation,
he should have “raised the issue to the trial court by an appropriate motion.”
I.R.C.P. 52(c). Having failed to do so, Marks may not now claim error in the
district court’s failure to do so. Id.
Although Marks now characterizes his Motion to Supplement Petition as a
motion to amend, he has failed to provide any argument or authority to support
any claim that a proper motion to amend should have been granted. Instead, as
explained above, he attacks the district court’s analysis of his I.R.C.P. 15(d)
motion, and ultimately concludes: “The district court erred in denying the motion
to supplement or amend the petition to add two additional claims.

For this

reason, this Court should reverse the order of summary dismissal.” (Appellant’s
brief, p.7.) Having failed to show he was entitled to amend his petition with two
additional claims, there is no basis to reverse. See Murray v. State, 156 Idaho
159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,
263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996)) (noting an issue will not be considered if “either
authority or argument is lacking” and declining to consider appellant’s claim
because he failed to “provide[] a single authority or legal proposition to support
his argument”). Moreover, even if Marks were correct in his assertion that he
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was entitled to amend his petition with two additional claims, that is not a basis to
“reverse the order of summary dismissal” of other claims.
Marks has failed to show any error in the denial of the only motion he filed
– a Motion to Supplement Petition pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(d).
II.
Marks Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Showing Error In The Summary
Dismissal Of Any Claim Raised In His Post-Conviction Petition
A.

Introduction
Marks contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his “claim

that the state had denied him a fair trial by failing to conduct forensic
examinations.” (Appellant’s brief, p.8.) According to Marks, the district court
incorrectly concluded that such a claim could have been raised on direct appeal.
(Appellant’s brief, p.8.) Application of the law to this claim shows it was properly
dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.
Marks also contends that the district court erred in “fail[ing] to address
three of his claims” in its summary dismissal decision. (Appellant’s brief, p.9.)
The Court should decline to consider this complaint because Marks failed to
raise it the district court.
B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
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affidavits on file.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).
C.

Marks Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversing The District Court’s
Judgment Dismissing His Post-Conviction Petition
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for

post-conviction relief in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own
initiative. “To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject
to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 “if the applicant’s evidence
raises no genuine issue of material fact” as to each element of petitioner’s
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b),
(c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.
Marks’ first complaint with respect to the district court’s summary
dismissal decision relates to the dismissal of his “claim that the state had denied
him a fair trial by failing to conduct forensic examinations.” (Appellant’s brief,
p.8.) This allegation was included in Claim 10 of Marks’ petition in which he
alleged, in relevant part, that the state denied him a “fair trial by immediately
taking the alleged victims into it’s [sic] custody after the allegations were made
against [him] and failing to have an appropriate forensic examination of them
made.” (R., p.7.) With respect to this claim, the state submitted: “[T]here’s
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absolutely no duty on the part of the State to force any individual to undergo a
forensic examination.”

(3/29/2016 Tr., p.12, Ls.9-14.)

In response, Marks

argued:
. . . [T]he State has in their briefing and on the record here
today said there is no authority for the State to conduct forensic
examinations of alleged sexual assault victims.
The Supreme Court [sic] held in their findings of fact in the
direct appeal that these children were in the custody of the
Department of Health and Welfare. Idaho Code 16-1616 imposes
a statutory duty upon the Department to investigate the allegations.
There is certainly not only an authority for such examinations, there
is [a] statutory duty for the State to engage in such examinations.
(3/29/2016 Tr., p.22, L.22 – p.23, L.8.)
The state countered:
With regard to the duty of the State to investigate this type of
allegation, the duty does not include forcing someone to undergo a
physical examination. That’s very clear. And an investigation was
conducted and it was clear from the fact that the prosecution was
ultimately occurred [sic] -- that there was an investigation that
occurred and Health and Welfare obviously had an investigation
done. That’s why there was a wellness exam.
(3/29/2016 Tr., p.26, L.24 – p.27, L.7.)
The district court dismissed Marks’ Claim 10 on the basis that it could
have been raised on direct appeal. (R., pp.57-58.) Dismissal on this basis was
consistent with I.C. § 19-4901(b), which provides, in relevant part:
This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any
remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of an
appeal from the sentence or conviction. Any issue which could
have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and
may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it
appears to the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing
by affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted basis for
relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of
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guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been
presented earlier.
Although Marks did not identify in his petition what he believes constitutes
a proper “forensic examination,” it is clear from the opinion issued in Marks’
direct appeal that the nature and extent of the medical examinations was raised
at trial, and on appeal. Marks, 156 Idaho at 562-563, 328 P.3d at 542-543.
There is no reason Marks could not have also raised the claim he now pursues
with respect to the lack of a “forensic examination.” The district court properly
dismissed Claim 10 on this basis.
Marks argues otherwise, contending that “he needed to present evidence
as to the nature of testing that should have been conducted, as to the state’s
failure to conduct that testing, and as to how this failure rendered the trial
fundamentally unfair.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9.) Marks, however, has failed to
identify what that evidence is or why the record of his underlying criminal case is
inadequate for this purpose. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9.) Rather, Marks offers a
bare and conclusory assertion that the claim could not have been raised on
appeal.

This “argument” is inadequate to show error in the district court’s

decision dismissing this claim.

Murray, 156 Idaho at 168, 321 P.3d at 718;

Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.3d at 970.
Even if Claim 10 is cognizable in post-conviction, it was subject to
dismissal for the reasons articulated by the state in its request for summary
dismissal, i.e., the state does not have a “duty” to force a victim to undergo a
forensic examination. Marks presents no argument on appeal demonstrating
otherwise. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9.) Since Claim 10 fails as a matter of law,
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and because Marks received notice of potential dismissal on this basis, this
Court may affirm the dismissal of Claim 10 because this Court employs the same
standards on appellate review that the trial court applies in considering summary
dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671,
676, 227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010).
Marks’ final argument regarding the summary dismissal of his petition is
the district court’s “fail[ure] to address three of his claims.” (Appellant’s brief,
p.9.) This court should decline to consider this complaint because Marks could,
and should, have made his request for specific findings to the district court. See
I.R.C.P. 52(b) (“No party may assign as error the lack of findings unless the party
raised such issue to the trial court by an appropriate motion.”); cf. DeRushe v.
State, 146 Idaho 599, 602, 200 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2008) (post-conviction
petitioner cannot challenge lack of specificity in notice for the first time on
appeal); Caldwell v. State, 159 Idaho 233, 358 P.3d 794, 802-803 (Ct. App.
2015) (citing I.R.C.P. 52(b) in conjunction with rejecting petitioner’s request for
“remand and a new evidentiary hearing” because district court failed to address a
claim in its findings of fact and conclusions of law).

Marks’ failure to do so

prevents consideration of this claim on appeal.2

2

One of the claims Marks complains the district failed to expressly address was
his claim that counsel was ineffective for “failing to introduce testimony of a
psychological expert regarding suggestive interviewing techniques and the
phenomenon of group false allegations of sexual abuse.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.)
It is worth nothing that the district court likely did not expressly address this claim
in its summary dismissal order because Marks effectively withdrew the claim at
the summary dismissal hearing, admitting he could not meet his burden in
relation to that claim since the district court denied his request for a transcript
from another case. (3/29/2016 Tr., p.22, Ls.14-21, p.24, Ls.18-22.)
14

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment
dismissing Marks’ petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 13th day of January, 2017.

_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello _
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of January, 2017, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
DEBORAH WHIPPLE
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
at the following email addresses: dwhipple@nbmlaw.com and lm@nbmlaw.com.

JML/dd

__/s/ Jessica M. Lorello____
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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